As Halloween looms, practitioners in the First Circuit should be on the lookout for something terrifying that has been haunting their Circuit for decades.[1] Two cases have created aberrations in the First Circuit’s jurisprudence surrounding partial final judgments by allowing courts of appeals to overlook omissions present in a district court’s partial final judgment. As a result, practitioners who fail to appeal a procedurally deficient partial final judgment are at real risk of having a later appeal be considered untimely. Wary practitioners should take proactive steps to protect their appeal right.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54 states that “when an action presents more than one claim for relief—whether as a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim—or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more.”[2] Rule 54 was created in response to the increasing number of multi-claim actions spurred by the F.R.C.P.’s liberal joinder rules.[3] “Although the increased opportunity for joinder coupled with these case management techniques increases efficiency in the district court, they also create a substantial potential for prejudice from the delay in final disposition and appeal of what are quite frequently entirely distinct claims”—which is what Rule 54 seeks to remedy.[4] The requirements for Rule 54 are clear; the Court needs to make a determination that there is “no just reason for delay,” as well as provide justifications for that determination.[5] Courts, including the First Circuit, have required such justifications because they “help[] the district judge to sort out and weigh the competing considerations in his own mind, and it permit[] the appellate court effectively to review the ruling.”[6]
In Feinstein v. Resolution Trust Corporation, the First Circuit was faced with a district court that had expressly failed to fulfill one of these requirements.[7] The lower court had not provided a “statement of reasons” justifying the entry of partial final judgment.[8] The blame for this omission partially fell on the moving party, who had failed to identify this procedural requirement in its request for partial final judgment.[9] But despite this clear defect, the Court accepted jurisdiction nonetheless.[10] The Court, seeking not to “sacrific[e] substance on the altar of form,” looked outside of the district court’s judgment to the reasoning explained in each party’s motion requesting entry of partial final judgment.[11] These motions allowed the Court to assemble the reasoning that should have been present in the partial final judgment and consider the appeal based on this newly constructed explanation.[12] The Court concluded,“[b]ecause we deem the lower court’s justification for resort to Rule 54(b) to be both apparent and sufficient, appellate jurisdiction attaches notwithstanding the court’s failure to state its reasons.”[13]
Quinn v. City of Boston involved a similar set of circumstances.[14] The district court had again granted partial final judgment without making the “requisite findings nor explicat[ing] the reasons underlying its Rule 54(b) certification.”[15] However, the First Circuit accepted jurisdiction, this time relying on the facts present in the complaint instead of any motions by the parties.[16] The Court independently determined that half of the counts in the complaint contained “separate and distinct” legal issues that would need “materially different” proof separate from the remaining portions of the complaint.[17] The Court also stated that the “public interest” favored allowing the appeal because resolving these separate and distinct issues would have a large-scale impact.[18] Because these claims could be bifurcated and the public interest favored review, the Court accepted jurisdiction. [19]The Court concluded by stating that though “[t]he ‘findings requirement that we have superimposed on Rule 54(b) is important . . . it is not to be applied woodenly.”[20]
Despite Quinn and Feinstein conflicting with the First Circuit’s past cases, these cases remain good law to this day. That being said, they have not been cited for the propositions described above since 2013, and even there, the First Circuit declined to apply them.[21] Ease of practice and consistency with past case law counsel that these cases should be overturned. Quinn and Feinstein run afoul of Rule 54’s plain language, which requires that partial final judgment determinations be both express and made exclusively by the district court.[22] As Judge Cyr astutely observed, “[s]ometimes rules of procedure are perceived as mere formalities, even when important prudential policies are at stake; while their enforcement may on occasion entail an unwelcome appearance of wooden decisionmaking, the alternative is to spare the ritual and spoil the rule.”[23]
In conclusion, appellate attorneys in the First Circuit should be on the lookout for “something evil[] lurking in the dark.”[24] Quinn and Feinstein, are apparitions in the typical way courts approach partial final judgments and allow First Circuit Courts of Appeals to overlook clear procedural flaws by district courts. That means a document that legally shouldn’t be considered a legitimate partial final judgment may be found to be so anyway. An appellant caught in the dark may mistakenly believe they have time to file an appeal but be barred based on timeliness. To combat this, First Circuit attorneys should be sure to file a protective appeal to preserve their rights and always be fully aware of the unique risks that these cases pose.
If you are considering appealing a judgment against you, please contact the experienced appellate litigators at Eckland & Blando LLP.
[1] Research and drafting assistance provided by Mitchell Zaic, law clerk at Eckland & Blando LLP.
[2] Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
[3] See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427 (1956) (“With the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, there came an increased opportunity for the liberal joinder of claims in multiple claims actions. . . . [Sound judicial administration] demonstrate[d] that, at least in multiple claims actions, some final decisions, on less than all of the claims, should be appealable without waiting for a final decision on all of the claims.”) (emphasis in original).
[4] Fern M. Smith, Moore’s Federal Practice § 54.21(3d ed. 2025).
[5] See Fern M. Smith, Moore’s Federal Practice § 54.24 (3d ed. 2025) (“The district court not only must make an express determination that there is no just reason for delay, but should also provide some justification for that express determination”); see also Elliott v. Archdiocese of N.Y., 682 F.3d 213, 224 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[E]ven in a case such as this one, in which a district court clearly intends to enter judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b), it must state expressly that it has determined that there is no just reason for delay. If it fails to do so, that judgment is not a final judgment under Rule 54(b), and we do not have jurisdiction over an appeal from that judgment.”).
[6] Spiegel v. Trs. of Tufts Coll., 843 F.2d 38, 43 (1st Cir. 1988).
[7] See Feinstein v. Resol. Tr. Corp., 942 F.2d 34, 39 (1st Cir. 1991) (describing the district court’s failure to follow the requisite procedural requirements).
[8] Id. (“[T]he district court neglected to make specific findings or otherwise to state its reasons for allowing earlier-than-usual appeals to be taken.”).
[9] Id. (“We warned that ‘[a] party who seeks the special dispensation that Rule 54(b) envisions has an obligation, at the very least, to point out the requirement and to ask that the court … make a brief but particularized statement of its reasons [for acting],’ in order to demonstrate that the rule was being properly invoked. That warning went unheeded in this case.”) (citations omitted) (alterations in original).
[10] Id. at 39 (“While we could, of course, refuse to accept jurisdiction under the circumstances, we have concluded that this is the rare case where the absence of Rule 54(b) findings can be overlooked.”).
[11] Id.
[12] Id. at 39–40 (stating that the Court cannot “interpret [the district court’s] rule . . . . as less than an “express direction”).
[13] Id. at 40.
[14] See generally Quinn v. City of Bos., 325 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2003).
[15] Id. at 26.
[16] Id. at 26–27.
[17] Id. (describing the discrete nature of counts one through three of the complaint that distinguish those counts from the rest of the complaint).
[18] Id. at 27.
[19] Id.
[20] Id.
[21] Bos. Prop. Exch. Transfer Co. v. Iantosca, 720 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2013) (“Our prior cases treating the requirement for a Rule 54(b) finding as malleable have rested on conclusions that either the public or predominant equitable interest weighed in favor of adjudicating those appeals. . . . [H]ere we know of no public interest or other equitable argument for relaxation of the usual requirement of findings.”).
[22] Feinstein v. Resol. Tr. Corp., 942 F.2d 34, 47 (1st Cir. 1991) (Cyr, J., dissenting) (pointing out the problems described above in the majority’s reasoning).
[23] Id. at 48.
[24] Michael Jackson, Thriller (Epic Records 1982).